Omnivorous Feathered Apes in New Caledonia
Only three species of animals on Earth make tools: elephants, chimpanzees (as Jared Diamond would say, humans are the Third Chimpanzee), and New Caledonian crows. Meta-tool use is considered crucial in the evolution of humans. And, yes. New Caledonian crows are there. The crow's brain size as compared to their body size is comparable to many primates. As such it is appropriate to think of them as feathered apes. And, then there is their social structure, which is more like human social structure than that of any other primate – enabling a leap forward in evolutionary cognitive development.
You have to watch this: A Murder of Crows, NOVA (sorry, this is just a preview).
It won't just be cockroaches left after humanity self-immolates. I would bet crows will survive. And, give it several million more years of evolution, and the crows will fill our niche.
Frak Natural Gas! Watch GasLand
Financing Counter-Insurgency and Social Evolution in Afghanistan, Alaska Style
Back in 2003, Steve
Clemons wrote an Op-Ed in the New York Times suggesting the
adoption of the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) model in Iraq.
In the 1970's, during
the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the state realized that the new
oil leases would produce an enormous windfall. Its citizens set up the Alaska
Permanent Fund to manage this income, directing that the revenue be invested,
the principal remain untouched and the gains be used for state infrastructure
investments. A part of the proceeds was distributed as dividends to every
Alaskan. By July 2002, the fund had grown to more than $23.5 billion. Dividend
payments to Alaskan families averaged about $8,000 per year.
Unfortunately, the Bush Administration did not
head Steve’s advice, and Iraq’s oil revenues were not harnessed to achieve such
an equitable distribution of Iraqi oil wealth. Moreover, the way
that the Iraqi oil infrastructure was ultimately institutionalized ensured that
the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations were not happy (see here for a great
discussion of the issues that delayed legislation: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13298/why_iraqis_cannot_agree_on_an_oil_law.html), and certainly not "bought-in" to the national strategy. Frankly, the approach the Administration chose could not have gone much worse.
Afghanistan, on the other hand, has been thought to be entirely different because it was a country without any real natural
resources…until now. A New York Times article New York Times article recently shined a
light on a 2007 report by the US Geological Survey entitled Preliminary Assessment of Non-Fuel Mineral Resources of
Afghanistan, 2007. The NYT author, James Risen, indicated that
there could be as much as $1Trillion dollars in such mineral assets in
Afghanistan.
General Stanley McChrystal’s counter-insurgency
strategy is premised upon protecting the population, and ensuring a viable
economy in Afghanistan. Moreover, there is a huge need for social
evolution in Afghanistan, of a kind and scale that can only be brought by an
economic and industrial revolution. Perhaps it is time to think about how
an Alaska Permanent Fund type mechanism could be established that would allow
the exploitation of these resources to actually help Afghans, BEFORE the
industrial interests from the US, China, India and Iran tear the country apart,
no doubt by strengthening the hands of insurgents and warlords. Free
money is actually not difficult to sell to people. But, a real
leader will be needed to institutionalize something this bold, in a way that
would favor the population over global industrial interests.
My New Favorite Food
Quinoa(keen-wah) comes to us from the Andes,where it has long been cultivated by the Inca. Botanically a relative of swisschard and beets rather than a “true” grain, quinoa contains all the essential amino acids that the human body cannot makeon its own.
Not only is it my new favorite ingredient, but Wikipediagives it pretty cool coveragewhich I plagiarize beginning now:
The Incas,who held the crop to be sacred,[3] referredto quinoa as chisaya mama or mother of all grains, and it was the Inca emperor who would traditionally sow thefirst seeds of the season using 'golden implements'.[3]. During the European conquest of South America quinoawas scorned by the Spanish colonists as food for Indians, and even actively suppressed, due to its status withinindigenous non-Christian ceremonies.In fact, the conquistadors forbade quinoa cultivation for a time and the Incaswere forced to grow corn instead.[citation needed]
Not tomention that it is good for lowering my epically bad cholesterol. In searching out the health benefits of quinoa,I found this great article entitledHowto lower your cholesterol absolutely free (no prescription required). The scariest segment of this article, whichhad nothing to do with quinoa per se, is this -
“It is the hydrogenation of these oils thatmakes them toxic to the human body. They belong to a class of ingredients knownas metabolic disruptors. This is a class of ingredients that interferes withnormal human metabolism and includes ingredients like sodium nitrite, MSG,aspartame, and white flour.”
Could you imagine the difference it would make if the FDAchanged the food labeling rules to require that hydrogenated oils, sodiumnitrite, MSG, aspartame and white flour were all called metabolicdisruptors! Hard to sell that ashealthy.
Quinoa baby!
Dymaxion - Say it Five Times Fast
(Geo)graphic brought to you by a French Marxist, Francois Chesnais via a great, off-beat, and very strange article by Brian Holmes.
I was fishing around for the name of the map projection used in one of my new favorite books - "Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers" by Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau - and came up with this Wikipedia page. Unsatisfied by the explanation provided by wikipedia (though their graphics rock), I continued with the GoogleMachine on the InterWeb (which is a series of tubes...) and found Holmes' treatment, which I quote below.
"Published in France in 1994, this book was among the early attempts by the Marxist Left to grasp the industrial and financial transformations unfolding on a global scale. And it opens with a map, showing the hierarchy of inclusion and exclusion at work in an integrating world.
Finding the Wayfinders
Late last year, I was waiting in a orthodontist's officewaiting room, and ran across one of the coolest articles I have read in a while. It was an article by Wade Davis on Polynesian wayfinding in the magazine National Geographic Adventure. Rather than steal the National Geographic Adventure(which in retrospect I should have done), I figured I would find it online. Iassumed that my initial failure to find the article online was due to usererror. Week after week, in my abundantspare time, I Googled various combinations of search terms, and came upshort. Finally, finding myself back inthe waiting room, I rummaged for the magazine, and it was gone.
As it turns out, I was flummoxed because that was NationalGeographic Adventure's last edition, and the content was never put on the web. Read here for a sad explanation of the course of events (and for a pretty cool blog). But, in the course of searching for thearticle, I learned even more about open ocean Polynesian migration routes, the Polynesiancanoe replicas Hokule‘a and Hawai‘iloa, and the art of wayfinding. I've spent so much time working in the worldsof GPS, telematics, and digital navigation technologies that the notion of findingone's way across hundreds of miles of open ocean in a canoe with nothing morethan ancient wayfinding techniques is insane. The folks that populated Polynesia were hardcore.
The "star compass" is their basic mentalconstruct for navigation. The wayfindermemorizes the "houses of the stars", which are where the constellationscome out of the ocean and recede into the ocean. The star compass requires knowledge ofdifferent kinds of birds, their flight paths, and the distances that they arecapable of ranging from land. Itinvolves reading the luminescent plankton and other sea life and knowing whatthat means in terms of your proximity to a current or a landmass. And, then there is knowledge of currents'locations and where they go, as they will quickly take you to predictableplaces. It goes on and on. And, all this without a clock or speedometerfrom which one might gauge speed.
Anyways, the Davis' piece communicates this in an amazingway. Sorry, but I have not gotten to alibrary to scan in the article and post it. Since NatGeo failed to put their last issue on the web, does that makeit Fair Use? Until then, you will justhave to live with the less inspirationally written version from the PolynesianVoyaging Society of a different voyage.
China Turns 60
This (geo)graphic provided by Jeff Kerridge at Digital Globe.
"China celebrated its 60th anniversary of the creation ofthe communist party today in Beijing with a massive parade and flyover.
I'm pretty sure this is not quite as good in pan!
Seven Deadly Sins
What in the World is Going On?
THE REAL STRUGGLE IN IRAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.DIALOGUE
By George Friedman
Speaking of the situation in Iran, U.S. President BarackObama said June 26, "We don't yet know how any potential dialogue willhave been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran." On thesurface that is a strange statement, since we know that with minor exceptions,the demonstrations in Tehran lost steam after Iranian Supreme Leader AyatollahAli Khamenei called for them to end and security forces asserted themselves. Bythe conventional wisdom, events in Iran represent an oppressive regime crushinga popular rising. If so, it is odd that the U.S. president would raise thequestion of what has happened in Iran.
In reality, Obama's point is well taken. This is becausethe real struggle in Iran has not yet been settled, nor was it ever about theliberalization of the regime. Rather, it has been about the role of the clergy-- particularly the old-guard clergy -- in Iranian life, and the future ofparticular personalities among this clergy.
Ahmadinejad Against the Clerical Elite
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ran his re-electioncampaign against the old clerical elite, charging them with corruption,luxurious living and running the state for their own benefit rather than thatof the people. He particularly targeted Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, anextremely senior leader, and his family. Indeed, during the demonstrations,Rafsanjani's daughter and four other relatives were arrested, held and thenreleased a day later.
Rafsanjani represents the class of clergy that came topower in 1979. He served as president from 1989-1997, but Ahmadinejad defeatedhim in 2005. Rafsanjani carries enormous clout within the system as head of theregime's two most powerful institutions -- the Expediency Council, whicharbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and the Assembly ofExperts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader. Forbes hascalled him one of the wealthiest men in the world. Rafsanjani, in other words,remains at the heart of the post-1979 Iranian establishment.
Ahmadinejad expressly ran his recent presidentialcampaign against Rafsanjani, using the latter's family's vast wealth todiscredit Rafsanjani along with many of the senior clerics who dominate theIranian political scene. It was not the regime as such that he opposed, but theindividuals who currently dominate it. Ahmadinejad wants to retain the regime,but he wants to repopulate the leadership councils with clerics who share hispopulist values and want to revive the ascetic foundations of the regime. TheIranian president constantly contrasts his own modest lifestyle with theopulence of the current religious leadership.
Recognizing the threat Ahmadinejad represented to himpersonally and to the clerical class he belongs to, Rafsanjani fired back atAhmadinejad, accusing him of having wrecked the economy. At his side were otherpowerful members of the regime, including Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, who hasmade no secret of his antipathy toward Ahmadinejad and whose family links tothe Shiite holy city of Qom give him substantial leverage. The underlying issuewas about the kind of people who ought to be leading the clericalestablishment. The battlefield was economic: Ahmadinejad's charges of financialcorruption versus charges of economic mismanagement leveled by Rafsanjani andothers.
When Ahmadinejad defeated Mir Hossein Mousavi on thenight of the election, the clerical elite saw themselves in serious danger. Themargin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might have given him the political cloutto challenge their position. Mousavi immediately claimed fraud, and Rafsanjanibacked him up. Whatever the motives of those in the streets, the real actionwas a knife fight between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. By the end of the week,Khamenei decided to end the situation. In essence, he tried to hold thingstogether by ordering the demonstrations to halt while throwing a bone toRafsanjani and Mousavi by extending a probe into the election irregularitiesand postponing a partial recount by five days.
The Struggle Within the Regime
The key to understanding the situation in Iran isrealizing that the past weeks have seen not an uprising against the regime, buta struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, butrather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed theprinciples of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Irantherefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as inPrague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are eachcommitted to the regime, but opposed to each other.
The demonstrators certainly included Western-styleliberalizing elements, but they also included adherents of senior clerics whowanted to block Ahmadinejad's re-election. And while Ahmadinejad undoubtedlycommitted electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his ability to commitunlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a chanceto bring him down were arrayed against him.
The situation is even more complex because it is notsimply a fight between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, but also a fight among theclerical elite regarding perks and privileges -- and Ahmadinejad is himselfbeing used within this infighting. The Iranian president's populism suits theinterests of clerics who oppose Rafsanjani; Ahmadinejad is their battering ram.But as Ahmadinejad increases his power, he could turn on his patrons veryquickly. In short, the political situation in Iran is extremely volatile, justnot for the reason that the media portrayed.
Rafsanjani is an extraordinarily powerful figure in theestablishment who clearly sees Ahmadinejad and his faction as a mortal threat.Ahmadinejad's ability to survive the unified opposition of the clergy, electionor not, is not at all certain. But the problem is that there is no unifiedclergy. The supreme leader is clearly trying to find a new political balancewhile making it clear that public unrest will not be tolerated. Removing"public unrest" (i.e., demonstrations) from the tool kits of bothsides may take away one of Rafsanjani's more effective tools. But ultimately,it actually could benefit him. Should the internal politics move against theIranian president, it would be Ahmadinejad -- who has a substantial publicfollowing -- who would not be able to have his supporters take to the streets.
The View From the West
The question for the rest of the world is simple: Does itmatter who wins this fight? We would argue that the policy differences betweenAhmadinejad and Rafsanjani are minimal and probably would not affect Iran'sforeign relations. This fight simply isn't about foreign policy.
Rafsanjani has frequently been held up in the West as apragmatist who opposes Ahmadinejad's radicalism. Rafsanjani certainly opposesAhmadinejad and is happy to portray the Iranian president as harmful to Iran,but it is hard to imagine significant shifts in foreign policy if Rafsanjani'sfaction came out on top. Khamenei has approved Iran's foreign policy underAhmadinejad, and Khamenei works to maintain broad consensus on policies.Ahmadinejad's policies were vetted by Khamenei and the system that Rafsanjaniis part of. It is possible that Rafsanjani secretly harbors different views,but if he does, anyone predicting what these might be is guessing.
Rafsanjani is a pragmatist in the sense that hesystematically has accumulated power and wealth. He seems concerned about theIranian economy, which is reasonable because he owns a lot of it. Ahmadinejad'sentire charge against him is that Rafsanjani is only interested in his owneconomic well-being. These political charges notwithstanding, Rafsanjani waspart of the 1979 revolution, as were Ahmadinejad and the rest of the politicaland clerical elite. It would be a massive mistake to think that any leadershipelements have abandoned those principles.
When the West looks at Iran, two concerns are expressed.The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, and the second relates toIran's support for terrorists, particularly Hezbollah. Neither Iranian factionis liable to abandon either, because both make geopolitical sense for Iran andgive it regional leverage.
Tehran's primary concern is regime survival, and this hastwo elements. The first is deterring an attack on Iran, while the second isextending Iran's reach so that such an attack could be countered. There areU.S. troops on both sides of the Islamic Republic, and the United States hasexpressed hostility to the regime. The Iranians are envisioning a worst-casescenario, assuming the worst possible U.S. intentions, and this will remaintrue no matter who runs the government.
We do not believe that Iran is close to obtaining anuclear weapon, a point we have made frequently. Iran understands that theactual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to immediate U.S. or Israeliattacks. Accordingly, Iran's ideal position is to be seen as developing nuclearweapons, but not close to having them. This gives Tehran a platform forbargaining without triggering Iran's destruction, a task at which it has provedsure-footed.
In addition, Iran has maintained capabilities in Iraq andLebanon. Should the United States or Israel attack, Iran would thus be able tocounter by doing everything possible destabilize Iraq -- bogging down U.S.forces there -- while simultaneously using Hezbollah's global reach to carryout terror attacks. After all, Hezbollah is today's al Qaeda on steroids. Theradical Shiite group's ability, coupled with that of Iranian intelligence, issubstantial.
We see no likelihood that any Iranian government wouldabandon this two-pronged strategy without substantial guarantees andconcessions from the West. Those would have to include guarantees ofnoninterference in Iranian affairs. Obama, of course, has been aware of thisbedrock condition, which is why he went out of his way before the election toassure Khamenei in a letter that the United States had no intention ofinterfering.
Though Iran did not hesitate to lash out at CNN'scoverage of the protests, the Iranians know that the U.S. government doesn'tcontrol CNN's coverage. But Tehran takes a slightly different view of the BBC.The Iranians saw the depiction of the demonstrations as a democratic uprisingagainst a repressive regime as a deliberate attempt by British state-run mediato inflame the situation. This allowed the Iranians to vigorously blame someforeigner for the unrest without making the United States the primary villain.
But these minor atmospherics aside, we would make threepoints. First, there was no democratic uprising of any significance in Iran.Second, there is a major political crisis within the Iranian political elite,the outcome of which probably tilts toward Ahmadinejad but remains uncertain.Third, there will be no change in the substance of Iran's foreign policy,regardless of the outcome of this fight. The fantasy of a democratic revolutionoverthrowing the Islamic Republic -- and thus solving everyone's foreign policyproblems a la the 1991 Soviet collapse -- has passed.
That means that Obama, as the primary player in Iranianforeign affairs, must now define an Iran policy -- particularly given IsraeliDefense Minister Ehud Barak's meeting in Washington with U.S. Middle East envoyGeorge Mitchell this Monday. Obama has said that nothing that has happened inIran makes dialogue impossible, but opening dialogue is easier said than done.The Republicans consistently have opposed an opening to Iran; now they arejoined by Democrats, who oppose dialogue with nations they regard as humanrights violators. Obama still has room for maneuver, but it is not clear wherehe thinks he is maneuvering. The Iranians have consistently rejected dialogueif it involves any preconditions. But given the events of the past weeks, andthe perceptions about them that have now been locked into the public mind,Obama isn't going to be able to make many concessions.
It would appear to us that in this, as in many otherthings, Obama will be following the Bush strategy -- namely, criticizing Iranwithout actually doing anything about it. And so he goes to Moscow more awarethan ever that Russia could cause the United States a great deal of pain if itproceeded with weapons transfers to Iran, a country locked in a politicalcrisis and unlikely to emerge from it in a pleasant state of mind.
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